In Spain, the 2014 European Elections saw the unexpected rise of a new party, Podemos, which obtained five European Parliament seats only 3 months after its formation. In the Spanish National Elections in December 2015, this party obtained 20.66% of the votes, which made it the third biggest party. Our objective was to analyse the old and new elements of Podemos' communication and campaign strategies. The methodology followed herein used this new party as a strategic case study by a qualitative approach. The analysis focused on three key fronts: 1) the role of communication; 2) mediatization of politics; 3) use of digital media. The results suggested that Podemos' 2014 electoral campaign combined presence on broadcast television and use of intense digital media to boost citizens' engagement and self-mediation. Accordingly, it was established as a new transmedia party. This case also demonstrates that mediatization can also occur in two-way street dynamics, that is, from politics to the media, where the former generates an influence on the latter. This finding opens the door to help overcome the mediacentric vision. Finally, we discussed future questions about the influence on other political actors' communication strategies in different parts of the world from an international perspective.
Introduction
In Spain, the European elections held on 25 May 2014 had an unexpected result:
Podemos, a new political party, received more than 1,245,948 votes (7.89% of the total), and it won five seats in the European parliament.
1 This party, formed only three months before these elections, had the fourth best showing in a dynamic political context in which new political parties, closely linked to the activist movement 15-M, 2 participated for the first time.
Methods
This study uses Podemos as a strategic case study to examine the role of communication in this political party. A qualitative methodology is employed to observe and understand elements of continuity and discontinuity. Eight sources and materials were used for the analysis, as follows:
1. 
Divulgation books about Podemos
The study period begins when the party was launched (17 January 2014) and ends at the 2014 European election campaign (from 16 March to 25 May 2014, inclusive) . This period was selected to carefully examine the point when the project was consolidated and became highly active in terms of communication. Podemos is a highly dynamic phenomenon with constantly evolving internal dynamics and formal structure.
This study focuses only on the first stage of the party's existence.
Literature review: Politics and activism faced with the media and digital tools
The mediatization of politics Mediatization theory explains how political communication works (Strömbäck and Esser 2014) . The theory is based on the key role of mainstream media, particularly television, in contemporary society as the major intermediaries for access to social knowledge. This position gives the media the ability to condition all of society's spheres (Hjarvard 2013; Hepp 2013) . From this perspective, mediatization holds that mainstream media significantly influence societies and democracies. This premise has important consequences for political communication. The citizens' perceptions and knowledge of politics are highly mediatised. Thus, the event representations created by the media and disseminated through news outlets could have relevant effects on citizens' perceptions of politics.
The mediatization theory is grounded in a tradition that advances the idea that media have strong effects. In this sense, it continues a tradition initially driven in the 1960s and 1970s with other approaches, like agenda setting, or later framing, priming and indexing. However, other frameworks suggest that the media have minimal effects on political communication. This paradigm emerged in the 1940s and 1950s with the importance of interpersonal communication and the two-step flow model based on the preponderance of opinion leaders (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955) , and was taken up again in the 1980s and 1990s. Nowadays, the fragmented media environment that emerges from the increase in digital media facilitates the further supply of information, the many options for the public to choose, and greater selective exposure. For these reasons, Bennet and Iyengar (2008) argue that the future of political communication will be defined by minimal media effects. However, other scholars argue that the strong effects paradigm remains in the centre of the field (Holbert et al. 2010 ).
Today's media environment is changing with not only the rise in digital media, but also the transformation of social and political structures, which affect the presspolitics relationship. Political actors can bypass the mainstream media using digital platforms (Schulz 2014) . Citizens and other social actors can create and disseminate political content to become potential sources of information (Castells 2009 ), which result in flows of information that are relatively more fluid and difficult to control (McNair 2006 ) and a more diverse, fragmented, and polycentric communication environment (Chadwick 2013 ). This development is opening a fault line in the mediatization of politics because digital media can contest the rules of broadcast television.
However, several critical authors propose that mediatization is a poorly defined concept (Deacon and Stanyer 2014; Lunt and Livingstone 2016) . The main criticism lies in its media-centrism. It bestows the media with an unassailable leading role as a catalyst of social change, and its overlooks the influences of non-media factors (Deacon and Stanyer 2014) . The media are perceived as institutions of extraordinary power with strong effects on all types of political and social practices. The media's influence is also perceived as encompassing and affecting all the other social spheres in unilateral, nonreciprocal relationships. Therefore, in this context, we must understand the contention that politics depends on the central functions of the media according to mediatization theory (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999) . This contention generates negative views of the media's influence on politics because it highlights the media's perverse effects on politics (Livingstone 2009 ).
Along these lines, mediatization assumes that political actors have no other option than to adapt to the media's rules and criteria (Strömbäck and Esser 2014) .
Political actors cannot avoid doing so if they desire public visibility. Yet, Deacon and Stanyer (2014) maintain that alternative reactions and responses are possible. Another concern is that mediatization focuses almost exclusively on classical types of mass media and does not account for the media in the digital environment (Jensen 2013) .
The use of digital media in electoral campaigns
Digital media introduce certain novelties into electoral campaigns because they offer new tools for political communication. Recently, institutional political actors who have incorporated digital media into their communication strategies have engaged in a rapid process of adaptation (Lilleker et al. 2015) . The integration of these tools has increased in campaigns to the point of becoming something natural and quotidian that is taken for granted as 'mundane Internet tools' (Nielsen 2011) . The generalised use of digital media in campaigns has been stressed since the 2008 US campaign led by Barack Obama, which marked an inflection point (Bimber 2014) .
The body of literature demonstrates that digital media are part of the total campaign mix and do not function in an isolated way (Enli and Moe 2013 
Communication in Podemos as the backbone of its political project
Many analysts agree that Podemos' electoral success is difficult to separate from the aspect of communication, which is the backbone of its project (Postill 2015; Sampedro 2015) . Unlike conventional political parties, which employ their communication strategies as instrumental elements at the end of the political decision-making process,
Podemos situates communication at the core of its political strategy. Thus, from the beginning, communication is integral to the political process and to any political activity driven by this transmedia party.
This approach could largely be explained by Podemos' understanding of politics based on discourse theory and the importance of hegemony (Howarth 2005; Errejón 2011 ). This is a neo-Gramscian perspective, which asserts that political activity is a struggle to dominate 'common sense' and assumes that social and political facts are framed by certain discourses. The dominant discourses generate a hegemonic sense that establishes legitimacy and the social support of citizens for policies, parties, and political leaders. This perspective takes a constructivist approach that, following the theories of Laclau (1990) and Mouffe (1995) , 4 asserts that discourse creates political identities constructed by conflict and oppositional relationships based on differentiating 'us' from 'them' according to Carl Schmitt's friend-enemy scheme. 5 The significance of discourse to construct identities and impose hegemony situates communication as a strategic tool of great importance to Podemos' political action.
Podemos' strategic positioning in the face of mass media
The founders of Podemos were a group of academics at the Complutense University of What many people never imagined is that we reflected very much on our intervention in the media, that it never depended on us, and that we took years getting ready for it.
[…] We began by assuming the audio-visual field, which made up the most important areas of political socialisation.
[…] I always say that people do not become members of political parties, unless they do so in the media. (Rivero 2014: 95-96 Podemos' jump to the media Podemos' strategy for broadcast television was implemented in two stages. The first was the creation of an alternative television program in community media. One of We do what a political party should do. We are delivering arguments to what Gramsci said that a party had to do as an organic intellectual: arm many people in their workplaces, in their centre study, in the bar, with friends, with family … to act as a supporter. […] We are doing what a political party should do: produce ideology through a new mechanism that is television. (Torreblanca 2015) . The idea was to use the rules of broadcast television to their advantage because Iglesias answered provocations and attacks with speech aiming to influence the audience with clearly alternative political content emphasising criticisms of the established parties and referring to them in the framework of a 'caste' (Dader 2015) .
Podemos' experiences in television are reminiscent of the prevalent infotainment tendency. Because of that style, commercial television networks welcomed Podemos, recognising that Iglesias' controversial nature and willingness to confront conservative commentators would increase audiences (Sampedro 2015) . Podemos and television benefitted from this relationship in that the former gained visibility and public recognition whereas the latter economically profited. A complicit partnership developed between these two actors typical of the relationship between media and political populism (Mazzoleni 2014) . Similarly, Iglesias' later appearances on commercial television were broadly diffused on social media in a hybrid form, which echoed his message and amplified his visibility (Toret 2015) .
Mediatization of politics in Podemos
The founders of this new political party stressed the importance of recognising mainstream media as fundamental outlets for the political socialisation of citizens.
Iglesias stated that 'Television talk shows are much more important than debates in Parliament' (Rivero 2014: 98) . Podemos' diagnosis is clearly related to the importance of mainstream media for current political communication. The party heavily invested in participating in television talk shows as a springboard for jumping to the centre of the political debate. Iglesias considers this a lesson to the 'traditional left', which scorned this area and he stated that 'It is senseless going to such debates. It is counterproductive.
We will continue what we've always done, chatting with 12 people …' (Rivero 2014: 99).
The 2014 European election campaign was merely an opportunity to implement the political communication that its members had been practicing for years (Torreblanca 2015) . During the campaign, Podemos employed two key elements linked to the process of mediatization for attracting media attention: (1) simplification of the message and appeals to the emotional aspects of politics and (2) Podemos' founders claimed that translating complex political diagnoses into simple, straightforward concepts and sentences was important. The party noted that, along these lines, preparations for Podemos' interventions in the mainstream media were always preceded by one question: 'Are you going to talk for the left or for people?' 12 That is, when faced with the choice of a relatively more intellectual or comprehensive discourse, the second option was chosen as a way to reach larger audiences and fit into the culture of broadcast television (Dader 2015) . Podemos prioritised the creation and diffusion of popular statements addressed to ordinary people and used all of its available discourse tools to that end (Palao 2015) .
This strategy included using emotions as mobilisation mechanisms Iglesias' idea of leadership includes being a good television communicator, a personage capable of bringing his or her message to political debates with clarity.
Leadership is understood in strategic and communication terms and as a mechanism to
project Podemos' politics to larger audiences. One aspect of initiatives claiming to redistribute power and responsibility that occasionally generates internal tension with the base is the dimension of internal organisation. One key instance of the party's use of leadership during the electoral campaign was its decision to change the logo on the voting paper in the 2014 European elections at the last moment. Podemos opted to replace its logo with a picture of Iglesias' face, a decision made by the person in charge of the campaign, Errejón, who stated:
The decision, never made before in Spain, of placing his face on the voting paper as the most well-known communication sign, was highly criticized for its purism as being decisive in elections in which most voters decided who to vote for on the last day.
(Errejón 2014: 1).
The decision was motivated by the Podemos' founders' pragmatic attitude to opt for the mediatization of politics and to follow the parameters of political marketing as an electoral strategy. Errejón concludes that 'Pablo Iglesias' media-based leadership was a sine qua non condition and it precipitated a process of popular excitement and aggregation'. 16 In the two months before the European elections, only 6% of Spanish citizens were aware that Podemos existed, but 50% were familiar with Iglesias (López García 2015).
Social media as a natural space for Podemos
The use of social media in the 2014 European elections campaign was another key factor in Podemos' rapid development. Social media were a natural space for this new transmedia party in tune with the social movements from which it emerged. The No one has ever stopped and really thought about the idiosyncrasy of SNS. These parties conceive social networks as a loudspeaker for questions that arise, which are decided somewhere else. They make a direct diversion that does not respect, as it were, the peculiarities of this medium.
Digital media as an organisational tool: The Círculos
SNS played an important part regarding communication and internal organisation because these were the foundations on which the party's organisational structure was laid during its establishment and in the 2014 electoral campaign. The principal manifestation of this was the Círculos (Circles).
The combination of traditional and new political logics in the Círculos made it an attractive area for Podemos to concentrate its communication and organisational innovations. The Círculos were the basic political units through which Podemos was organized and that shaped its structure and the groups of people whose main objective was to encourage political participation and attract people to it. In this respect, it is important to emphasise its openness: It was not necessary to be registered with Podemos to participate in its activities because, as Iglesias stated in his blog, 'spare no one'.
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The Círculos could be territorial regarding a city or neighbourhood, or it could be sectorial when managing a particular policy area, such as healthcare or education.
Their growth has been remarkable. In the 2014 European elections, Podemos had 200
Círculos, which had increased to 800 by October of 2014, reaching about 165,000 registered people.
The Círculos' appearance was initially spontaneous and chaotic because it developed from a call by party promoters asking citizens to form circles en masse.
Initially, the party leadership had little control over these units. Along with some basic guidelines that claimed a need to preserve the Podemos DNA and avoid overlapping onto another Círculo in the same area or sector, the only requirement to initiate a The horizontal structure and collaborative nature of the Círculos generally mirror that of social movements, particularly the 15-M. At the beginning of its activities, which were linked to the 2014 European elections, members apparently believed that these units were having real political effects as platforms for the expression of political opinions and forums where members could be heard. However, despite their potential for citizen empowerment, the evolution of the Círculos has generated criticism. 22 Their assembly characteristic has led to ineffectiveness in the debates and in political action efficiency, which tend to feature apparently endless discussions and poor results. Furthermore, in some cases, the operations of many
Círculos have created monopolisation of activities by small groups of members, which challenges the Círculos' principle of openness and horizontal nature.
The newer logics linked to digital media have an important role in the political and communicative activities of the Círculos. SNS were key tools for organizing and publicising their activities. Facebook was the principal instrument through which the assemblies were convened. These assemblies were open to the public, and they were held in the streets and other similar locations because many Círculos did not have stable physical headquarters in which meetings could be held. The preferred spaces for organising and mobilising were the digital networks. Digital media contributed to extending the Círculos, supporting their efforts for calls, discussions, messages, and political activities to reach a diversity of individuals. Twitter was used to propagate messages and stimulate digital conversations. TitanPad and Telegram were used to coordinate some campaign launches, Reddit was used to activate debates and discussions among the people, and Appgree was used to vote for measures to elaborate the collaborative electoral program.
Using new media enhanced the decentralisation logic in the creation of SNS Podemos' campaign strategy in the 2014 European elections consolidated a multidimensional or multi-layered strategy linked to techno-politics, which efficiently combined numerous actions and communication spaces (Toret 2015) . Podemos managed to move forward within two separate spaces (mainstream media and digital media) to mobilise citizens using a constant combination of and feedback from these two types of interaction. Thus, Podemos was established as a new transmedia party that moved among types of media, logics, while privileging communication as the central feature in its political action.
The party also used digital media to boost citizens' engagement and empowerment by promoting connective action through the Círculos (Bennett and Segerberg 2012) . Podemos linked SNS to political participation and citizens' selfcommunication. Via these digital platforms, it provided its bases with voice and offered its digital networks to citizens to activate their political self-mediation.
The findings provide new insights into the emergence of mediatization. It moves thought away from the notions that mainstream media are innately powerful over political actors (Deacon and Stanyer 2014) and that mediatization is a unidirectional and non-reciprocal relationship between the media and politics, meaning politics that are inevitably influenced and colonized by the media. The case of Podemos demonstrates that mediatization could occur in a disaffected way to promote two-way street dynamics; e.g. from politics to the media, in which the former influences the latter.
Thus, non-media factors also are influential and can activate this process, which can be found at several analytical levels in Podemos. From the macro-level perspective, a change emerges in the party system through the brusque appearance of a new populist political organisation arising from social activism, which drives democratic regeneration and rejects the political elite, to become an indispensable factor. In the meso-level view, the incorporation of digital media into the communication strategies of political parties is essential to generate citizen participation in transmedia dynamics that expand and enrich the party's message though media and networks. Another strategic factor is to 'hack' the media from knowing how the political economy of communication works, particularly on television. Podemos is aware of Pablo Iglesias' personal popularity and his controversial and polemic interventions in political talk
shows, which helped to increase audiences and, thereby, television networks' advertising revenues. This benefit made Podemos' leader an attractive product for television, and it provided him with access to mainstream media. Indeed, television helped him to become a well-known star in Spanish politics. Therefore, the mediatization process does not necessarily mean that the media system colonizes the political system. Media-conscious politicians, such as Pablo Iglesias, could mediatise for their political purposes (Birkner 2015) , primarily as a way to legitimise and influence journalistic agendas. There could be other cases of new political leaders who approach the populist style, such as Donald Trump, Bernie
Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn, and Alexis Tsipras, who could be studied from this perspective to understand emerging communication strategies.
These findings problematize the notion of strong effects inherent to mediatization theory, and highlight the interdependent nature between political actors and mainstream media. This is possible because: 1) the changes in society linked to the economic crisis and lack of faith in the political system 2) lead to the appearance of new populist parties such as Podemos, in conjuncition with 3) the rise of digital media.
These phenomena manifest the prominence of exogenous and non-media factors in the mediatization of politics. Two-way street mediatization demonstrates another interpretation of this process. The ways Podemos strategically maneuvered vi-a-vis the media suggests that the media is not necessarily powerful on its face. There is a complex negotiation and even manipulation of the agenda of the mainstream media.
Thus, our analysis of Podemos lends support for the arguments of Bennet and Iyengar (2008) .We note, though, that other forms of media influence, such as agenda setting, indexing or priming, may still be important.
Podemos' strategy challenges the mediatization of politics theory (Mazzoleni and Schütz 1999; Strömbäck and Esser 2014) by demonstrating that this theoretical approach must be reconceptualised to expand its dimensions, to incorporate the rise of digital media in political communications, and to recognize the emergence of hybrid dynamics (Chadwick 2013 The second scenario is that the communication strategy influences other traditional left-wing parties mired in identity crises. Corbyn's success in the Labour party has demonstrated how the so-called 'outside' is rapidly becoming the so-called 'inside' of a traditional party, using a discourse that resonates as an antidote to elitedriven politics. Some similar trends can be found in Sanders' struggle within the US Democratic Party. In Spain, the PSOE responded to Podemos' success with a new communicative strategy and by sometimes assuming that one must accept the rules of the mainstream and digital media to better reach one's opposed public and to keep the mediatization of politics in one's favour.
Last, a third future could be one in which right-wing parties adopt some transmedia elements to strategically promote two-way street mediatization and to bend transmedia logics to their electoral benefit. The Alternative for Deutschland discourse accuses governors of being traitors and Donald Trump's rhetorical and xenophobic antiestablishment diatribes in the US are two examples of this. The outcomes of these three scenarios include increased organisational hybridity (Chadwick 2007) , through which established parties adopt the digital network repertories previously considered within the purview of social movements, and the latter could take on a party structure. In this case, new organisations with hybrid forms and transmedia styles could emerge. The
Podemos case is relevant because it is a pioneer of these possible changes in political communication and democracy, which will certainly emerge in other parts of the world. 
